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understand it. The definition says nothing about an intention to exchange performances as to a portion of the goods contracted for. It is a price term rather
than a performance term. Consider its application to the cases where there has
been a partial destruction of specific goods before the title passes and the buyer
elects to take title to the remaining goods.8
Just as in the preceding paragraph re divisible contracts I, have probably
failed to make my point clear by trying to compress too much into too little, the
author here and there makes brief and rather dogmatic statements that require
more elucidation to be correctly understood. Speaking of cash sales, for
example, he says that although in general the rule is that if the goods are
specific and nothing remains to be done by the seller, the presumption is that
title passes at the time of the bargain, but "the parties show a different intention
where the contract requires the goods to be paid for cash on delivery." 9 But
might it not be a sale with a vendor's lien? If nothing renmains to be done by
the seller I think it would and should be so construed. It is indeed difficult to
put into definition the conception of a technical cash sale. If all the duties on
both sides are to be closed out simultaneously with the bargain, as in an overthe-counter bargain accompanied by delivery of the goods and payment of the
price, we have a cash sale. Again, if payment by the buyer is conditioned on
simultaneous completion of some positive duty by the seller and vice versa, e.g.,
delivery by the seller to the buyer's place of business "cash on delivery", we
have a cash sale.'0 But if the buyer is to take delivery at some time subsequent to
the bargain and nothing remains to be done by the seller but to let the buyer
take possession when he comes for the goods then the phrase "cash on delivery"
imports that the seller does not propose to give up possession until he is paid.
On principle it should be presumed that title passes.'1
But enough of grandstand quarterbacking. Professor Whitney has steadily
enlarged and improved his book through three editions. The comprehensive
coverage of New York cases, of the Sales Act, of the Conditional Sales Act,
of the Bulk Sales Act and of the Trust Receipts Act makes this edition exceptionally useful for New York lawyers. Lawyers and students everywhere will
find it to be an excellent summary of the law, furnishing a wealth of illustrative
cases.
GEORGE W. BACON.*
ON RESTITUTION.
By Edward S. Thurston. St. Paul: West Publishing
Co.,' 1940, pp. xxviii, 964.

CASES

Restitution is an act by which exact reparation so far as possible is made
for an injury which has been done to another. This is the definition of restitution considered from a moral standpoint.
8

N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 88, 89.

9 P. 41.
10 Levin v. Smith, 1 Denio 571 (N. Y. 1845).
"I The case which is regarded as laying the foundation for the rule that
title is presumed to pass if the goods are specific and in a deliverable state at
the time of the bargain and nothing remains to be done by the seller did so hold.
Tarling v. Baxter, King's Bench (1827) 6 Barn. & C. 360.
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
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According to the moral law, if one person injures another, he offends
against justice. This he may do, if he keeps what belongs to another, or damages the person, the property or the reputation of another. Justice demands
that the damage be repaired. Hence, the wrongdoer has an obligation, binding
in conscience, to make reparation for the injury which he has done; the person
wronged has a right to have the damage repaired.
Our civil tribunals recognize and enforce a legal obligation to make restitution. When equity decrees that one person is entitled to a specific thing, it is at
once adjudging that one person has a right to that thing and that another person
has a duty to restore that thing. When, at law, a judgment is rendered for a
sum of money, it is at once adjudged that one pers6n has a right to a sum of
money, and that another person has a duty to pay that sum of money. Both
obligations are restitutionary in their nature. Much of the substantive law is
devoted to a consideration of the circumstances under which this right and duty
coexist. Demonstrably, therefore, a general, comprehensive consideration of
the principle of restitution in all its ramifications would invade many of the
courses usually included in a law school curriculum.
The author of this excellent collection of cases does not consider all those
factual situations wherein the principle of restitution, as broadly defined, has
specific application. Manifestly, this would exceed the spatial possibilities of a
single volume. He carefully limits, lays out and plots his field. He judiciously
includes, and he prudently excludes. To use his own language, he treats of
"the legal principle of restitution whether enforced by an action at law or by a
suit in equity; that is to say, those restitutionary rights which are enforceable
either by the common law counts in the action of general assumpsit, under the
head of quasi contract; or by a bill in equity. The latter category includes the
equitable doctrines as to the rescission of conveyances, contracts and other
documents for fraud, mistake or duress, and a substantial part of the doctrines
as to the reformation of such writings." He does not include certain restitutionary remedies such as those enforced by the common law actions of ejectment, replevin, detinue, and trover, nor by the equitable device of constructive
trust.
Even as so limited, this volume covers a broad field. The table of contents,
lengthy and detailed as it is, gives but an inkling of the manifold, varied factual
situations wherein the legal principle of restitution has application. If this
wealth of material were mismanaged or improperly assembled, the book would
be a jumble. This the author skilfully avoids. By appropriate classification of
both cases and materials and by ingenious arrangement, he has produced a work
which would be difficult to surpass in clarity, consistency and continuity.
Close scrutiny of each chapter, separately and in detail, discloses how carefully the author adheres to the basic idea incorporated in each chapter heading.
As a result each chapter, with all its branchings and intricacies, produces a
single integrated impression.
The chapters are arranged in a sequence well adapted to a proper approach
and a systematic and effective development of the whole subject.
The cases are selected from many jurisdictions. But, obviously this is not
done for the purpose of giving the book a national market, but rather because of
the intrinsic merits of these cases. Most of them are well written; many of
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them possess the desirable attribute of brevity; they are richly suggestive rather
than exhaustive.
To this reviewer, the author of this volume seems to have been ever aware
of student and classroom requirements. It possesses those qualities which are
calculated to make an effective vehicle of instruction. It is a notable contribution in this field of the law.
GEORGE

CASES ON DAMAGES.

By Judson A. Crane.

F.

KEENAN.*

St Paul: West Publishing Co.,

1940, pp. xx, 521.
Once more this reviewer is asked to comment on the good book of an excellent workman with whose views of law, the approach and attitude toward
it, the technique of it, and the methods of teaching it, he is in general accord.
Disagreements about details, however, can involve matters of considerable importance, for it is upon his choice of the details that the efficiency of every
teacher depends. However, where there is agreement about essentials, even
serious disagreement about details can mean only that the critic of the workbook of a fellow teacher would feel himself circumscribed in his use of the
book by the editor's choices of content, content-form and layout.
Mr. Crane's workbook in Damages would better serve your reviewer and
those-very few, perhaps-who think as he does if there were more stimulation by way of materials permitting an approach through lessons of history and
particularly the history of the law of damages under the writs, which, for
practical purposes, we take as an historical starting point. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Internationtal Paper Co.,' Mr. Crane's first case, would, in
a book to please this reviewer more, be followed by others which would aid
in an understanding of modern principles of damages on the basis of historical descent from the days and the purposes of the writs. At various places
throughout the book the chosen cases make this approach possible,2 but your
reviewer likes more of the stimuli to historical thinking to appear earlier in
.a volume in order that it may operate upon the student mind throughout.
What is done with history's influence, of course, depends upon the resourcefulness of the teacher and hence, so far as the historical process is concerned,
this reviewer refrains from criticism on the basis of the editor's failure to
include historical materials other than cases.
As for the other processes, the analytic is well served by the sufficiency
of the number of cases; 3 the others are left to the teacher who uses the book.
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.

'132 F. 92 (N. H. 1904).
2 Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (Q. B. 1703), the
first case in Mr. Crane's Chapter 2, and Forsyth v. Wells, 41 Pa. 291, 80 Am.
Dec. 617 (1862), to mention but two.
a There are 130 cases in the book. The editor has not seen fit to number
them, so that the figure must be arrived at by counting in the Table of Cases
the items which are stated as being case opinions.

